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The article considers what monetary requirements  must be met if  the
conditions within the customs and economic union are really to be similar
to those obtaining in a d,omestic market and whar measures  should be
taken to ensure progress in this direction.
Some of my points have already become topical, for example the questions
relating to the elimination of the day-to-day fluctuations in exchange
tates, the idea of "fteezing" currency parities,  the improvement  of murual
assistance  anangements and the measures to be taken in this connection
to strengthen  the organizational framework.  Recent events have shown
how acute these problems are and how far we lag behind the requirements
of our time.
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I.  The economic objective  of European integra,tion
Quite apart from political  factors, there is a powerful economic, motive
binina ihe driu" td unify Europe, a motive which would suffice by itself
to justify efforts to achieve  etonomic integtation: the welding of six
economies  into one new large economic area is liberating  a considerable
number of additi,onal  forces making for expansion. These forces will
enable the prosperity  of the new area to be raised substantially beyond the
level attainible lf  each of the participating economies pursued an economic
policy of its own, operating behind the shelter of taiff walls and other
protectionist measures commonly resorted to.
The process of economic integration is aimed at cteating in the new area
conditions similar to those of a domestic market, such conditions being
indispensable if all the benefits of growth and prosperity are to be fully
exploited. As a consequence of the exra investments firms are willing
to make to prepare for the new and larger market a special growth effect
will be produced. Any failure to complete integration would not only
mean giving up the advantages a merger brings with it, but would also,
since the forces making f,or growth in the larger area would not be
exploited fully, entail a definitive  yearby-yeat  loss of growth which would
clearly represent a margin of prosperity irretrievably  forfeited.
Any hiatus in the integration process would therefore  be harmful. Inte-
gration will take on its full meaning only if it is full integration.  Hence
there is a need to extend the common market f,or goods and services,
which is almost completed, to a common  market for the factors of pro-
duction. In order to create such a cornmon factor market. all restrictions
must be eliminated  which impede the movement of the productive forcesacross the frontiers. There is also a need for an alignment of the legis-
lation now in force in the Member States: crurent disparities  would give
some countries an unfair advantage over others if differences in the legal
requirements  governing the production  process were allowed to persist
aftet taif(. barriers had been rernoved. Differences, for instance, in
company law' and in taxation would prevent optimum adaptation of the
structure of production  to the requirements  of the new large economic arca.
il.  Conditions  similar to those of a domestic  mafket  :
the monetary side
The objectives of Article 2 of. the EEC Treaty can be fully attained
only if  all national foreign exchange regulations liable to distort the
pattern of p,ayments and transfers between the Member  States are with-
drawn and if all other legal and institutional  obstacles are removed which
may prevent  capital - 
a major production factor _- from moving  across
the monetary frbntiers. There are three minimum  requirements. Firstly,
it must be possible to effect payments within the customs union under
legally secure conditions atd at minimum cost. Secondly,  the movement
of"short-term funds and capital within the union must be liberalized  and,
thirdly, firm action is neelded to create a European capital market. In
addition,  the confusion connected with the units bf acco.tttt currently used
in the European Communities  should be cleared  up.
1. Secur'i.ty  of payments taithin tbe custorts union
If the task of creating within the customs union conditions similar to
those of a dcmestic market is also to include monetary matters, substantial
progress  must be made in the fields at present covered by Atticles  106
to 109 of the EEC Treaq,.
Goods, services, capital and persons will be able to move freely-within
the Community only if effoits are made to dispel all shadow of doubt
as to the irrevocability of the permission to effect the resultant  payments
and the accornpanying transfers across the internal frontiers.
This is, however, not enough. There will be certainty as to the Present
and future effects of the -law ,onlv if  businessmen  are sure of being
at any time able to effect the req-uired  Payments and transfers and if
they Lnow in advance  at what rate of eichange the transfer-  from one
.uri.n.y int,l the other will be made. TherJ are at least four points
which are of televance here:
a) Quite apart from the recent recourse by France to -a split foreign
exchinge mirket (regarded  as a temporary meisure), the Belgo-Luxembourg
econor;ic and monitary union is- still operating such a split market.Under this system, part of the transfer is normally effected throueh  the "free" market, where the rates of exchange  arc laigely free from 6fficiut
intervention  and are formed by the forcis of r,rpfly and demand. As
the monctary authorities are under no direct obligation to intervene in
this market,.there is at least a temporary possibility of fairty wide devia-
tions occurring from the rates in the "regulated"'market  and from the
official pariry, and this, by cre-ating a risk of additional cosr, is a special
impediment to certain_  types of capital movement. This last split folreign
exchange market would have to be unified.
b) The removal of the double foreign exchange markets would have to be
underpinned  by a pledge from all Member States to relinquish multiple
foreign exchange  rates and similar pracrices in their relations with each
other.
c) At the momenr it is only between  the Belgian and Luxembourg  franc
that the parity is taken as a basis when the currency of one Comhuniry
State is exchanged  into that of another. In all other cases the basis is
the market .rte qu,oted from day to day. Both the International  Monetary
Fund and the European  Monetary  Agreement allow the rates used in
daily business to fluctuate within a iertain range around the declared
parities. 
- Under the European Monetary Agreement the monetary  author-
ities need nor intervene  tb influence tie diily fixing of the rates on rhe
exchanges as long as the rate recorded in rerms oI the US dollar does
not rise above ,or fall below the dollar pailty by more than 0.7j%. As
the total range of fluctuation of I.5% in terms of the US dollar can have
a cumulative effect on the formation of the exchange  rates between  the
currencies of the member countries, it is theoretically possible  that between
one transfer and a subsequent  refund the fate of exchange fluctuations
may reach as much as 37o. There will be no c,onditi5ns similar to
those of a domestic market as long as these daily fluctuations affect the
calculation of amounts of one currency in terms oi another.  Accordingly,
arrangements should be made so that the parities are used as exchange
rates for payments within rhe Common Market. This is all the more
important  as the exchange  of one currency for another entails costs and
expenses  which can laryely be avoided if the parities are used.
d)_ The off]cial pledge advocated  under b) would, however,  not prevent
a Member State from changing the parity of its currency in relatiori to the
currencies of other Member  States. Althouqh each Member State is alreadv
bound by Articls 107 to ffear irs policy-with regard ro exchange  rates
as "a marrer of common inreresr", itrls iule and t"he increasing eEonomic
interpenetration  within the common Market are not an absolute bar to
changes in exchange parities. It would decidedly be a betrer conrribution
to the creation of conditions similar to those of a d,omestic  market if
the parities were "frozen" once and for all within *re Common  Market.
The measures refered to above could well be adopted in the order thev
have been listed.Once the parities have been fixed, if not indeed before, new problems
;iii-.ri;;  in the field which today is covered by th9 escape clauses of
Ariicles 108 and 109 of the EEC Trcary. The Member States will then
only be able to change their parities together and vis-i-vis non-member
.o"'nrii.r.  lr.s long is in this situation the- r-esponsibiliry for balance-
of-oavments equilifrium at national level and for exchange resefves  has
;fili  b...t tiuo.f.rred to community institutions'  tt'e least that would
n"o.'a be d,:rr. to create conditions siririlar to rhose of a domestic  market
would be to see that the movement of goods and of product-ion -factors
.u' no-iorg:r be interfered  -with through .the applicaiion  of safeguard
.l"or., ..r.uiting suspension of common market ariangements' . , The ban
o" ,..o*t.  ti  a 
-balance-of-paymenrs 
safeguard  clause would in this
i"",."i-t"".  to be assessed diff6rently depending  on whether a Member
a;.4  Juu-,rn,r difficulties w€fe the fesult of deliberate  domestic policy
ot *.t.  dit. to external influences.
In the case of payments difficulties due to domestic factors,  there. might
b. u ..rl for imposing stricter conditions before granting  mutual assistance.
if, t o*.u.t, th6 pay"ments difficulties wefe external in origin, the aim
should be to rnake the use of safeguard  clauses  unnecessary'
The new rules could entfust to the Commission the task of establishing
*tr.ttt.r the reasons for the payments  difficulties  were of an internal or an
external nature. \flhere theie-are external reasofls' it should, in line with
ihe principle: of solidarity, be sufficienr for the granting of mutual
assist'ance bir,ding all parties that in the Council the Member States not
Jii..iry uff..ted iecide by qualified maiority in favour of such action.
2. Li.beralization of tbe mouement of capital and' shorr-term' fund's uithin
tbe Union
It would, ,of course, be much easier for the Belgo-Luxembourg  economic
"ril"  ," cfeate a uniform foreign exchange market as- stipulated above
f  uU-orfr.t Mtember States took, aI the samJtime, action both to eliminate,
i"-,tr.lila"tions with each other, all foreign exchange restrictions still
in force and also to femove the other obstacles listed in the draft, laid
tefore the Council some time ago, of a- third- directive impleme-nting
lrti;I.  61 ol, the EEC Treaty. Tf,e-obstacles referred to include admin'
it,.uiiu"-ptu.tices affecting tlre issue and the admission of securities to
rhe stock'exchange,  regulitions for institutional investors concerning the
emDlovment of their funds, etc.
Conditions  si:milat to those of a domestic market would in fact not exist
;;;ia;;h  tirme as borrowers and in particulaf issuers were treated on
an equal footing with residents, no matter what Member state they were
from^and no m-a6er what capiial market of the Communiry they wished
to efltef.Also relevant here are those taxation rules which impede or distort capital
movements  berween the Member States. There are tax privileges of
certain finance institutes; withholding  taxes on the yield of securities
differ with regard both to the methods used and the rates charged;
caPital transacti'on  taxes and company taxes (on first acquisition of shares)
mean additional  costs; the taxation of distributed and undistributed  profits
varies from Member State to Member State, etc.
N7here capital movements are conceroed, the approaching  expiry of the
transition period - 
on 31 December  1969 - 
is imposing certain time-
limits on the Member Stares. Liberalization of capital movements only
- 
perhaps even on the basis of a narrow interpretation  of the Treary
"To the extent necessary f.or the functioning of the Common  Market...") - would not suffice. A uniform market for production factors can be
established only if the short-term money flows are also freed from national
oonsffalnts.
3. Creation  of a European capi,tal marke,
It has been stated above that it is not enough to eliminate national laws
that constitute an obstacle but that something should be done to overcome
the "natural" inertia (that is an inertia for which there are in mosr
cases institutional  reasons) of the flows of payment within the currency
ftontiers, and this applies in particular to rhe creation of a uniform large
market to balance the supply of capital throughout the union with the
demand for it over the same area: with stock exchange practices, pro-
visions  governing new issues, credit systems,  rules on the activities of
financial intermediaries and institutional investors, etc., varying gteady
from one Member State to another, the free play of the markit forces
would still be considerablv affected even if there were comDlete  freedom
of movement  of capital and of short-term funds.
A single capital market mtist, however, be established if the danger is to
be avoided of distortions of competition  due to differences  in ease of
access to the sources of finance or in the cost of obtaining finance.
Nor, in the new large arca, should the choice of location of operations
be influenced by financing  considerations. A final argument in favour
of a single capital market is that without it European companies will
not have access to a sufficient oolume of funds to eoable them ro compete
with the indusuial  and financial giants of ,the other trading narions.
As a Community  institution must act as a driving force if favourable
market  conditions  are to be created for the formation and employment  of
capital on a Community  scale. the Commission will have to take the
initiative with regard toih. hui-onization, co-ordination  and in particular
the modernization  of the laws and regulations  affecting  the organization
of the capital market, the credit system, institutional investors  and financial
intermediaries.In the meanwhile a working party of the vatious Directotates'General
of the new Commission and a working party of the Monetary Committee
are pressing .forward with their work on the practical implications of the
t.poi, on Y1'he Deuelopment  of a European^Capital  Malket" drawn up
1; 1961166 by a group of independent experts at the request of the
EEC Commisision.
4, Unit ol account: ueating order out ot' cbaot
Several units of account are being used at the moment in the European
Communities.  Let it suffice here to give a brief and necessarily  incom-
plete account:
i)  The specific dudes of the customs tariff of the European Communities
are expresseil in terms of a unit of account  whose value is fixed at
0.83857088  ,g of fine gold. This is the same as the present official
gold pariry ol the US dollat. Since the recent change in the gold policy
of thE United States -  if not before -  it has been clear what risks
are inherent in a unit of account which is defined in terms of gold.
The arrangeroents  concerning the unit of account of the customs tariff
do not provide for any automatic adjustment,  whether in ttrg event of
a change in the value of gold or in other cases. 
_ The Council, however,
which Jixed these units of account in 1960, obvi'ously  has power to
change  the definitions.
ii) Two additional types of units of account are used for the budgets
of the European Communities.  The unit used for Eurarom  and EEC is
also invariaS.te  at 0.88867088 g of fine gold, The Commission may,
however, submit a supplementary budget if there is a change in the
currency parities of one or more Member States.
iii) In so fa.r as the ECSC still has a special budget after the merger
of the executives, the unit of account used is that of the European
Monetarv Agreement, a unit whose value is the same as the others' There
is no piovision for automatic adjustment; the definition can, however,
also be changed at any time - 
though not by the Council of Ministers
of the Europiian Communities but thro'-ugh an amendment  of the European
Monetary  Agr:eernent  decided upon in the framework of OECD!
iv) The conlmon agricultural policy was until recently- using a unit of
account simil.ar to the one used for the customs tariff. However, the
risks inherent in the use 'of this unit of account led the Commission  to
submit proposals some time ago for the amerrdmenl -of the regulation,
and a nei deliinition was introduced  at the end of May 1968.
v) The capriral of the European  Investment Bank is fixed in terms of
units of a&oont which are also defined as having a fine gold content
of 0.88867088  g. There is no pr'ovision for automatic  adjustment of the
definition; in ihe case of ceriain pariry changes the Council of the 10Governors of the Bank may, however,  decide that certain consequences
normally resulting automatically from the use of rhis unit of account
afe not to occuf.
vi)  Another type of unit of accounr is used in the association agreement
with the African  States and Madagascar. It is also based on the sime fine
gold content as the other units. There is, however,  provision for an
automatic change of the gold content if the International Monetary Fund
decides to change the price of gold; there is an arrangement ior the
Council to review the situation if special circumstances  aiise. The same
type of unit of accounr is used in tlie association agreement  with Turkey.
vii) The unit of accounr used in the association  agreemenr  with Greece
is quite simply the US dollar.
The co-existence of differenr units of account, most of them moreover
based on a quantity ,of gold, has not so far occasioned  inconvenience in
the Community, but it would by no means simplify the situation if the
units of accounr were ar any time actually required in practice for use
as 
- the guarantee they now provide on paper. The eommission  has
endeavoured  to put the agriculrural unit of account on a different basis.
There is a srrong case for a thorough reappraisal of the whole problem.
It would be considerably easier to find a solution if the final pattern of
parities (see section II (1) between the currencies of the Member stares
w-ere already fixed. This framework  could then supersede  gold as a basis
of reference.  Creditors  would be given the right -of askin! for payment
i3 t!e. Cogmunity  currency  of -their choice, with the exchang? relationships
fixed in advance serving as a basis. Pending  the definitiv6 esrablishment
of a pattern of paritiesf an aftempt shoutd bE made to reduce the number
of units of account. The authoiities  should consider how far it would
be possible ro pur the unit of account immediately on the basis of a
pa*grl of parities that does not depend on goldl depending on the
field in which the unit is. being used, a solution to diificultiEs arising
might te to adopt differing implementing  arrangements.
Such ,simplification  could help creat€ an instrument which could be used
in a Communiry-scale,capital market by borrowers and lenders pending the
rrxlng ot the pattefn ot pafltres.
III.  Problems  and how they might be solved
Once the changes in ,the monetary  field that are indispensable to create
the conditions of ^ 
domestic  market have been made- - 
and for that
matter, while they are being made - 
a number ,of questions will have
to be clarified both inside the union and in respect of the relations with
the outside world. The aim of this section is io discuss the chief prob-
lems and to point to ways of solving them.  ^  1l1. Need,  f or internal safeguatd's
It would be a mistake to imagine that it would be sufficient to declare
the parity relationships within the union immutable by a legal act. If
no a-ction is taken to iafeguard the acrual economic basis for this measure,
cifcumsrances could well iender it inapplicable, since decisions and devel-
opments in t.he national  economies migf,t affect the market in such a way
as to make nc,nsense of legal undertakings.
If the pariry relationships within the .Community  Y.9r9 irnmutable while
nationaf curiencies  whicli were in all other fespects still largely independent
were maintal.ned,  balance-of'payments problems would continue to arise
in the indiviclual.countries. In i situation in which there are fixed parities,
a non-integrated  economy could counter- .these -national  payments  prob-
lems by chlnging  the level of prices and/or, influencing.  the .employment
situation,  depEnding on the rype of problem involved. As they are
growing  together in the Community,  the economies are' however, no
l"onger "able-ro influence on their own authofity the internal employment
situ-ation and the price level within the country to the same extent as
before. Thir; is betause, firstly, the free movement  of goods and factors
of productiorn in the new large area is bringing with it increased  inter-
deGndence of prices and costs and, secondly,  certain instruments  of
naiional economit policy have lost much of their effectiveness  at national
level. There is, f6r instance, a tendency for the pressure of rnonetary
and credit measures  to leak away through the national frontiers; with the
impediments  to the flows of payments  gone, the opportunities for the
Me^mber  States' national  authorities to influence  money supply within the
country have been sharply reduced.
In such a situation, undesirable developments which occut in a given
member  courntry are not only .much more difficult to combat by means
of the natio:nai instruments  of that country, but in their effect on the
national balance of payments  also tend to be.strengthened  by. the market
forces. If there is e-xciss demand ar narional level, goods can be imported
unimpeded  {rom other parts of the new large market; this .will .check
the upward thrusr of plices in rhe cou,nrry, registering the in{lationary
trend'bur will also inclease the national balance-of-payments deficit; at
the same tirrre there is an inflow of workers whose remittances also place
a burden oo the balance of payments; it  would only be the capital
atrracted by r:he consequent improvement  in the profit outlook and flowing
in from ofh.t putrt of the union - 
thsls would at first be no exchange
risk - 
that ,would initially feduce the pressure on rhe balance of payments.
It must, ho'uever, be realized that legal assurances  Jegarding the free
movem€nt af capital and fixed exchange r-ates could, in view of the
developmentr;  in ihe Membet State concelned, very soon lose their credi-
bilirv and tlhat the exchange hazard would then be likely to lead to
a reversal  of the flow of. caPitaL L2lJ7ith the effects of economic policy mistakes committed ar narional  level
working thelr way freely and ?onsequently rather rapidly thr,ough to the
economies of the partner states, there has been a vigorous  increase in the
interest every member country takes in what the others do - 
and in
what they fail to do. The concept of the "common  interest"  aheady
used in the Treaty is thus assuming its full meaning.
The pressure to co-ordinate  to which the national authorities would be
exposed  at least over the longer term would be quite strong. There is
reason to fear that the demands  thus made on the self-discipline of
government authorities, both sides of industry and lobby groups might go
bey'ond what is tolerable  and that this might lead to developments thar
were not compatible with a fixed patrern of parities.
In the face of this situation, nobody wants to restrict the freedom now
enjoyed by unions and managements;  nor can pressure  groups seeking to
influence official economic policy be forbidden; if fixed parities are none
the less desired, then the only solution is the increasing transfer to the
Community  of responsibility  for payments  equilibrium in the six countries.
There are in the main rwo problems which are of interest in this context:
a) As long as the responsibility f,or the balance-of-payments  equilibrium
has not yet been transferred completely  to a Community body, the main
requirement  is that the Member States agree on economic poliry objec-
tlves.
b) If this responsibility is to be exercised progressively ar Communiry
level, institutional  arangements  must be made to allow of agreemenr  on
the decisions actually to be taken.
Where. agreemenr on economic objectives is concerned,  those desiring
to establish  fixed parities must cleady understand  that an important condi-
tion must be fulfilled if, for reasons of social policy, the employment
situation in all the Member States is to be good and if worker migration
is not to be treated  as a mere pressure-equalization  device. That condition
is that price levels in the different countries are nor allowed to drift
too far- ipart. This, is less a question of day-to-day  politics than a prob-
lem of a concerted  approach for the medium-term.  If, for insiance,
the medium-term economic  policy projections showed that the ave:age
annual price increase expected over rhe next five years was L % 1n
one membef country and 2.5% in another, it would have to be feared
that the difference of 7.5% expected in the price trend in five years'
time would not be compatible with fixed paritiis within the Commlnity.
The Commission would therefore  have to acr ifl its capaciry as an earlv-
warning  authority and as an independent  adviser. Undesiiable develoi-
ments would have to be combated by active measures. This requires,
of course,  that all concerned should be able ro agree on common  obje-tives,
an aim which will not be easy ro achieve. Over the longer term ihere is,
however, a definite need for agreemenr on common  objectives, since I3failure to reach such agfeement would mean that it would- be -im-possible
io -uk. rhe monetary ".rrurrge*.nts which are indispensable if. there are
to be conditions similar to those of a domestic market, and that the
itng  of che exchange  rates would not only make no sense but would
give iise to additional difficulties.
As regards the institutional  arrangements  for agreemelt !n .the decisions
^it"uliv 
to be, taken, the situation"is likely to vary with the instrument of
"corro*i. 
policy involved. The examples of financial policy and rnonetary
policy are Exa.mined in more detail below.
Monetarv  policv will lose much of its effectiveness  at national  level under
the conditions aimed at. As it may, however,  given certain arrangements,
lluy un imp,:rtant role at Communiry levei in the economic  policy of
'tt e union t6rvards non-member countries, it would, as time goes on, lend
itself well to iSeing used in fairlry large measufe as a Communiry  instrument.
Once agreem,ent iad been reaihed on rhis principle,. the^question would
ariie inimediately  as to rhe narure of the deCisjon-iaking Community body
needed in th,e event. Should decisions be taken on the Council pattefn
by fepfesentatives  of the individual  Member  States or on the Commission
pl*.t'o, with the acceptance  of instructions from the Member States being
ruled out?
If decisions  were taken on the Council pattern by representatives  of the
Member Stat,es, this could easily entail the risk that individual govern-
*.n,, o, cenLtral banks would wish to impose a specific point of view,
res,rlting in package  deals of little service -to the Communiry cause,. and
ihut ptStttp,'decisi[ns  would not be possible. Although at national level
oolitilcians^are aDr ro fieht, in the finai analysis, for fairly close dependence
tf  ,n. central tunk o"tr ih. go.t 
"tn*enr, 
there might therefore still be
a case for envisaging for Eur-ope an independent  central monetary  body
on the ComrnissiSn -putrern. Unlike a federative  executive, such a body
*oold ptobubly  be iess harassed by conflicts of national interests and
would 6e able'to decide more rapidiy in line with the merits of the case.
This does not mean that the m"t?rbel countries' central banks would have
io retire into insignificance.  In fact, thg Il.S Federal  Reserve System could
well serve as a basTc guide to European thinking in this field'
As monetary policy will be largely deprived of its effectiveness  at national
level it can'bie exiected that thoie {r tharge of national economic policy
*ltt *irtr to maki increasing use of the instruments of financial  policy.
Giu.n, however, its effects -on the balance of payments, financial_policy
will then bercome a very special obiect of "common interest". Hence,
there will bg a stfong nead fof c6-ordination.  Federative  c6nsultetive
bodies in which the inldependent  commission should be represented  with
a right of vote would have to be given an increasingly- -im-portant 
say
in oitline decisions taken at national level; this powef could, for instance,
i^f." trr. form at first of recommendations  and subsequently  that of t4binding directives. It may suffice to point to rhe importance attaching
to the scale of government budgets, the nafure of revenues and expenditure
and the financial policy (including debt managemenr and government
credits) from the angle of short-term economic policy and balance-
of-payments policy. There is therefore a need not only for a central
monetary body but also, in addition to the already customary meetings of
the Ministers for Economic Affairs, for regular Council meetings of the
Ministers of Finance, regular meetings of the state secretaries  concerned
and fot a reassessment  of the work of the Budget Policy Committee,
which should meet rnore often.
These comments on the harmonization  of objectives, the use of monetary
policy as a Community instrument and the need for increasingly binding
co-ordination  of the basic decision of financial policy should have shown
that freezing the exchange  rates between the Member States would not
only exert a more or less strong actual pressure  to abandon independent
national economic policy but would at the same time also have to lead
in a number of respects to the abandonment of the exclusive and unco-
ordinated  exercise of certain sovereign rights.
But there are other implications and other needs.
A rational economic  policy should endeavour  to maximize prosperiry  gains
in the long run. There is general agreement  that price and cost stability
is indispensable if there is to be optimum growth over the longer term.
If Europe wishes to pursue an economic policy along tational lines it is
therefore  necessary  but not sufficient that the expectations and objectives
of one Member State should be compatible  with those of another. The
task is rather to agree on objectives and pursue policies  which make our
continent a Communicy based on stabiliry rather than a Communiry  based
on inflation.
This is what the governmenm  ,of the Member States must decide to do.
2. A coherent  policlt on external  nzonetary  relations
It stands to reasofl that the development of a European monetary  system
needed within the common market for goods and the factors of pro-
duction must be accompanied  by a change in external monetary  relations.
Here a basic principle is that the new large area has a considerable  interest
in the smooth working of international trade and international payments.
Some changes in extetnal relations would follow almost  automatically.
If, for instance, the Member States abandon multiple  rates of exchange,
abolish inside the Communiry the day-to-day  "spread" ,of the rates of
exchange and establish a fixed paftern of parities,  there will be a tendency
for both spot and forward rates to show about the same deviations from 15the pariW in. relation to cutrencies  ftom non-member  countties:  under
these'coniitic,ns  it would normally not mattef for residents of non-member
counrries which of the currenciei of the Member States they used. The
result of the tendency to equal "spreads" in relation to outside curlencies
would, howe'i,er, be 'that tire foreign exchange oPerations of European
central banks would have to be effected  along uniform lines or through
a ioinr agent since otherwise there is a danger that the effects aimed
at 'would "offs;et each other or that the balancei of payments of the indi-
vidual Member States would be distorted.
An additional point is that if the union decidls to pursue a policy of
stabiliry, a cruiial question arises in fesPect of the relations with non-
member countries: can the drive to achieve extensive  co-ordination  of
economic policy between the Community and the m-ain trading. qartners
yield resulis promising enough to dispel the danger of imported inflation?
If co-ordination among pattners enjoying equal rights is thought to be
feasible, one would havJ to opt, where the relations with non-member
countries  are concerned, for fixed parities with a spread either side of par.
If, however, such an approach is discarded  for one reason or another  the
choice over' the longef ierm will be between adjustment  of the parities
in instalmentr;,  as cuirently also practised under the Bretton \7oods  agtee-
ments, and flexible rates of exchange in relation to the main trading
partners.
The measures deemed  necessary if a fully effective internal  market is to
be built up ;in many respects almost automatically  imply the need for a
coherent eiternal  monetary policy. The European monetary  system to be
developed should therefore  -sooner or later lead on to monetary union.
One oif the union's features, to be aimed at at afi eady stage, would be
that in their relations with the outside world the Member States would,
from the an1y'e of monetary  policy, still appear as separate .entities but
that they wo:uld use a single spokesman  representing  the union, as they
did during'he  Kennedy  Round.
Such a uniform external  rnonetary policy would include:
i)  Harmonii:ation of the policy regarding  reserves,
ii)  A commc,n  attitude in the matter of teserve  curtencies,  and
iii) A commc'n stand on the future of gold.
It would go beyond the scope of this survey to study these  a-nd 
. other
pr'oblems of cxternal monetart policy in full detail. Some remarks in the
wav of a brief outline mav ther€fore  suffice. 16Harmonization of policy regarding  reserves could, of course, be confined
to a minimum requirement, i.e. the fixing of percentages of foreign
exchange, gold and credit balances to be held as monetary  reserves wirh
the international monetary institutions. It could, however, also mean the
pooling, in part or in full, of the reserves with a Community institute.
The policy vis-i-vis the reserve currencies  would be linked to the quesrion
of what prospects rhere are of arriving at a successful co-ordinaiion of
economic policy with non-member countries, with stability being the
common denominator, and to the choice taken as a consequence. In addi-
tion, it should, as a last point, merely be recalled that with Great Britain
a member of the European  Economic Community,  the problem of sterling
could be solved within rhe framework of a European reserve fund.
is much to be said for the view that in the longer
be considerably reduced in status as a determinant of
As for gold, there
term gold should
monetary policy.
IV.  Conclusions
The process of European integration should be carried to completion
since failure to do so would result in irretrievable  losses of prosperity.
Completion of the process of integration includes the creation of condirions
similar to those of a domestic  market. This applies  also to monetary policy.
In the monetary field, conditi,ons similar to those of a domestic  market
mean not only substantial measures of co-ordination on the part of the
Member States but also real sacrifices of sovereignty. In the monerary
field, conditions similar to those of a domestic marker also require i
coherent external monetary policy. A European monerary sysrem  and the
economic background required for its establishment  would thus go a long
way towards clailfying the questions arising t'oday with regard to the
international monetary system. The negotiations with non-member coun-
tries would in this connecrion have to be conducted in a soirit of
partnership and equality, with the Commission if possible repiesented
by a spokesman  as it was in the Kennedy Round.
Should the aim be t'o establish such a European  monetary system pro-
gressively or all at once?
There is cleady a certain dependent relationship  between monetary devel-
opments and developments  in the other fields. Although it would there-
fore be theoretically  possible to decide in favour of a common currency
to be introduced all at once, corresponding progress in other fields
would, in this case, have to be made with minimum delay. However, t7since to waive additional national  sovereign rights. requires great self'
restraint and in most cases even a victory over one's own Pohtlcal ego'
the aDproach to be adopted in practice will have to be one of advancing
step 'by 
st p.  The rilht tactiis here consist in action to ensure  that
onifi.utioo i1 the monEtary field never lags behind and is in fact always
slightly ahead, since the pblicy of ensuring a lead to the monetary  field
*JUa' at le?.st encourage-,. and perhaps,  .indecd,. provide a commanding
inducement  to, the integration process in other fields.
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